The history of semantics in generative linguistics raises questions. By the time project of providing for the languages we speak the same kind of formal semantics that logicians devise for the artificial languages of formal systems of logic. 'Formal semantics' originally signified semantics for formal languages devised for the mathematical study of formal systems of logic, but the expression now has a meaning akin to 'analytical philosophy' and signifies the Montague-inspired approach to the semantical study of natural languages. At the same time, many theorists-including many formal semanticists-recognize that the theories semanticists construct under the formal semantics rubric can't plausibly be regarded as theories of the kind needed to explain a speaker's knowledge of her language. The obvious question this bifurcation raises concerns the relation between, on the one hand, the psychologically explanatory semantic theories still thought to be needed but no longer the object of study in linguistic semantics and, on the other hand, the theories formal semanticists are concerned to construct. That question, I shall argue, becomes urgent when we understand the way in
1 In saying that GGH "emanates from MIT" I don't intend to be representing any particular linguist's views, let alone some time slice of Noam Chomsky. Rather, I take GGH to encapsulate a view that has a certain prima facie appeal and is close enough to what many theorists accept to sustain the conclusions I shall reach in this essay. The notion of a generative grammar utilized in GGH is, however, the view Chomsky accepted in his (1965) . processing sequence will be two intermediate states: first, a state that represents the generative grammar of the language (or part of a language) the hearer shares with the speaker, and at some point after that a state that represents the sounds produced by the speaker as tokening a sentence with syntactic structure Σ and semantic interpretation M, for some structure Σ generated by the grammar's syntactical component and some interpretation M that the grammar's semantic component assigns to Σ. This is another intuitively attractive picture, for an apparent platitude correlative to the one already mentioned is that one knows what a speaker means in uttering a sentence at least partly on the basis of knowing what the sentence he uttered means, and how could one compute the meaning of a sentence unless one's processing accessed a grammar that generated its meaning?
Much of this essay will be concerned with the question of what must be true of a semantic theory in order for it to be the semantic component of a generative grammar that verifies GGH. Now, there are broader and narrower ways of talking about "generative grammar," and some of these broader or narrower ways may be fueled by questionable stances on substantive theoretical questions. To take one prominent example, 3 Chomsky identifies a person's I-language with the internally represented generative grammar that results when the parameters in the universal grammar (UG) that is innately represented in the mind/brain of every normal child are caused by the very young child's exposure to the speech of those in her linguistic environment to take on the specific values that determine her to have out of all the possible languages she might have acquired the particular language she does acquire. But the information that can be used to fix the language-determining parameters of UG are, according to Chomsky, rather severely constrained by the nature of the language faculty (LF) and can't be information that can be acquired only by interactions between outputs of LF and the outputs of other cognitive and motor faculties. Consequently, the properties assigned to an expression by what he would call a generative grammar won't involve relations between the expression and external-world objects and properties, properties that would be needed to determine the expression's extension and enable speakers to use the expression in communication, but are instead "internalist" syntactic properties-albeit syntactic properties Chomsky 3 See e.g. Chomsky (1995) .
It wasn't long before heavy flak hit the theory Katz and Fodor went on to construct around those two components. The problem critics found with the theory wasn't that the theory wasn't true; it was rather that it wasn't in any suitable sense a semantic theory. For a theory that offers dictionary definitions of a language's words and then attempts to derive readings of its sentences on the basis of those definitions isn't telling us anything about the semantic properties of the language's expressions: it isn't telling us what any expression means or refers to, or what the truth conditions of any of its sentences are. For in the doubtful event that any word even has a correct dictionary entry, that entry wouldn't per se tell us what the defined word means; it would tell us only that it means the same as the dictionary's entry for the word. A person can learn what a word means from a dictionary entry only if she already knows what the dictionary's entry for the word means; a monolingual speaker of Arabic could know 8 Katz and Fodor, op. cit., p. 176. 9 Ibid., p. 181. 10 Ibid., p. 196.
every proposition asserted by a correct English-Italian dictionary and not know what any word in either English or Italian means. By Katz and Fodor's own lights, the semantic theory that functions as the semantic component of a generative grammar of a language must be able not only to give the "readings" for each sentence of the language, but also the content of those readings. So even if the theory they went on to construct were true, it wouldn't explain what they think needs to be explained.
The original critics of Katz and Fodor's theory focused on the inadequacy of the theory as a semantic theory, but one can also object to Katz and Fodor's construal of what it is to understand a sentence, and thus their take on what the semantic component of a generative grammar needs to explain. For there is one very obvious constraint that ought to be recognized by any theorist who seeks to say in what the ability to understand novel sentences of a language consists: whatever that ability is, it is one fully possessed by every fluent speaker of the language. Therefore, for no Φ can it be correct to say that the ability to understand novel sentences of a language is, or consists in, the ability to Φ unless the ability to Φ is possessed, and possessed to an equal degree, by every fluent speaker of the language. But the ability to determine "the number and content of the readings of a sentence, [to detect] semantic anomalies, [and to decide on] paraphrase relations between sentences" is an ability that some fluent speakers don't have at all and others have to considerably different degrees. At the same time, there is at least one ability that is clearly possessed by every fluent speaker of a language and that does seem to be entailed by the ability to understand novel sentences. This, suitably qualified, is the fluent speaker's ability to mean things by uttering novel sentences of her language and to know what others mean when they utter them. That is a thought to which I will presently return.
It didn't take long for it to become the consensus among linguists and philosophers of language that, as instructive and ingenious as it was, the first serious attempt to do semantics in generative linguistics was a step in the wrong direction.
Linguists interested in semantics in the mid-sixties were casting about for a way to pursue their subject. They were primed for an external influence.
II. Formal Semantics
The external influence that set linguistic semantics on its current course was the modeltheoretic approach to the metalogic of formal systems of logic that emerged from the work of logicians Löwenheim, Skolem, Gödel, Tarski, Church, Kripke and others in the years between 1915 and 1965, and the circumstances that account for how the model theory of formal systems came to influence the way linguists do semantics for natural languages occurred in Los Angeles in the late sixties. Let me explain.
By 1965 it was taken as established in the metalogic of formal systems of logic that mathematically rigorous precisifications of the pre-theoretic notions of logical truth and logical consequence could be given in terms of the explicitly defined notion of a formula of a formal language being true under a model-theoretic interpretation of the language. The value of such definitions was that they made it possible to give mathematically rigorous proofs of the soundness and completeness of systems of logic containing the formal languages for which the model-theoretic definitions could be given, when soundness and completeness were themselves defined in terms of the modeltheoretic account of logical consequence.
Also prevalent in 1965 was the view that "logical methods of formal language analysis did not apply to natural languages." 11 This had been Frege's and Russell's view of natural language; it was the view of Tarski, who showed how an unproblematic notion of truth could be defined for certain formal languages but not for natural languages, which languages he dismissed as "inconsistent;" and it was the view not only of formallyminded philosophers such as Carnap and Quine but also of the "ordinary language" philosophers who opposed them, such as the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and
Strawson. It was in the climate of this prevailing attitude that in the late sixties, Richard
Montague, a logician in UCLA's philosophy department who had been a student of Tarski's and whose work up to then had been primarily in intensional logic, turned his attention to the syntax and semantics of natural languages and wrote a trio of papers 12 11 Partee (2011; p. 18 Montague (1970a Montague ( ), (1970b Montague ( ), and (1973 linguistics was at a loss as to how to do semantics for natural languages, and she proved not only to be a lucid conduit for linguists to Montague's ideas but also an extremely effective proselytizer of those ideas. It was in large part due to her efforts as a writer and teacher that "formal semantics" became and continues to be the dominate approach to semantics within linguistics.
We need to separate Montague's conception of natural-language semantics from the conception of it he inspired in Partee and those whom she influenced. Montague makes three remarkable claims pertaining to natural-language semantics-namely:
(1) There is no important theoretical difference between natural languages and the uninterpreted formal languages of systems of logic.
(2) It's possible to treat a natural language as an uninterpreted formal language and to construct for it a model-theoretic semantics of exactly the same metamathematical kind that a logician would provide for the formal language of a system of intensional logic that captured the logical entailments expressible in the natural language.
(3) The construction of such a semantics should be the goal of any serious semantics for natural language.
These claims are incredible, in the literal sense of that term, and it's difficult to suppose
Montague didn't have his tongue in his cheek when he made them.
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Re (1) Montague' referred to him and the sentence '1 + 1 = 2' was true. In so far as he intended
us to take what he said seriously, would he deny that that difference between formal and natural languages was of any theoretical importance? I think in a sense he would. He rarely even mentions absolute semantic properties, but in one place where he is discussing lexical ambiguity (a type of ambiguity which, he says, is "rather uninteresting, to be sure" for we may not know that '7 + 5 = 11' has the same truth conditions as '56 is a prime'."
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The first sentence of Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer's classic textbook on formal semantics is their declaration that "to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions." 26 And in what was evidently a handout I found on the internet for the first session of an MIT spring 2003 course on "Semantics & Pragmatics," the instructor, whose name isn't given but whose approach to semantics is that of model-theoretic semantics, begins with the statement that the "goal of semantics is to properly characterize semantic competence." David Lewis, whose "General Semantics" was enormously important in the development of formal semantics, emphasized a distinction between "two topics: first the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract 24 Cresswell (1978, p. 12) . 25 Cresswell (1985, p. 145) . 26 Heim and Kratzer (1998 Lewis (1983) , p. 184. 28 Lewis (1999a: 13) .
of any given natural language.
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Partee is right to disassociate her interest in model-theoretic truth theories from attempts to explain language understanding, for it should be clear that if there is a semantic theory that is capable of being the semantic component of a generative grammar for a natural language that verifies GGH, that theory isn't a model-theoretic truth theory for that language. Crucial to assessing GGH is how we understand what it is to "understand a sentence," and, as we noticed earlier, there is an obvious but very important constraint on how we can understand sentence understanding: whatever we take the ability to understand sentences of a language to consist in, it must be something all normal speakers of the language share. As Montague, Partee and others conceive of a modeltheoretic semantics for a natural language, it would account for the logical entailment relations that obtain among the sentences of the language, but that is clearly not anything that needs to be accounted for by a theory that aims to explain the ability of those whose language it is to understand sentences of their language. To be sure, it's plausible that one who understands, say, the connective 'and' must know that if 'Roses are red and violets are blue' is true, then so is 'Roses are red' and 'Violets are blue', but that is hardly to say that a speaker of a natural language knows all the entailment relations that a correct model-theoretic semantics for the language would capture.
A theory that did account for the entailment relations among the sentences of a language would be doing something that was superfluous to explaining the ability to understand sentences of the language; but of course a theory with a component that was superfluous for explaining certain facts might nevertheless explain those facts. Might, then, the semantic component of a generative grammar that verifies GGH be a possibleworlds model-theoretic semantics for English whose theorems assigned to each truth- what the speaker meant in uttering σ? "The necessary and sufficient conditions for an utterance of the sentence to be true in an arbitrary possible world" can't be the right answer. It certainly can't be the right answer for sentences whose utterances can't have truth-values, such as the sentence 'Is she a politician?', but let's be charitable about the formal semanticist's ability to account for the meanings of non-truth-evaluable sentences in terms of the possible-worlds truth conditions of truth-evaluable sentences, if those truth conditions give the meanings of truth-evaluable sentences. In any case, there are truth-evaluable sentences which show that knowing the meaning of a sentence can't be equated with knowing its possible-worlds truth conditions. Two such sentences are:
(1) I would be well adjusted if I'd had different parents.
(2) She married an ax-murderer.
For suppose Kripke is right that it's metaphysically impossible for a person to have derived from any other sperm and egg than the pair that produced him. Then tokens of (1) and unembedded utterance of (1). The problem with (2) is interestingly different. In a possible-worlds model-theoretic semantics that has the best chance of assigning to sentences the possible-worlds truth conditions that tokens of those sentences would actually have, a token of (2) would be true in an arbitrary possible world w just in case the female to whom the speaker referred in his utterance of that token was married in w to someone who belonged to the set of ax-murderers in w. But for any arbitrary world w one could conceivably know of the set of ax-murderers in w whether or not any given individual in w belonged to that set even though one had no idea whether or not that person was an ax-murderer in w. This could be so if one's knowledge of the set of axmurderers in w was by enumeration, so that while one didn't know whether or not Jones was married to an ax-murderer in w, one did know that in w Jones's spouse belonged to the set whose members were {Bob, Carol, Ted, Alice, Kit Fine, …}, where that set was the set of ax-murderers in w; or it could be so if one knew that in w Jones's spouse belonged to the set of people who had the gene encoding the neurotransmittermetabolizing enzyme monoamine oxidase A, where that set was identical to the set of axmurderers in w. Therefore, possible-worlds model-theoretic semantics for English can't be a theory that explains sentence understanding, and therefore can't be the semantic component of a generative grammar that verifies GGH. (ii) that tacit knowledge is conjoined with other tacit or non-tacit knowledge she has, and (iii) from that combined state of knowledge she tacitly infers (no doubt via an "inference to the best explanation") that the speaker meant such-and-such in uttering σ.
What must ϕ be like if GGH is true? Here is a thought experiment that suggests an answer.
communication; and if, as seems plausible, it's because one's sentences have the meanings they have for one that enables one to communicate in the language, then it would remain the case that whatever internally represented semantic theory was needed to explain sentence understanding would also have to explain the language's ability to function as a medium of interpersonal communication.
You see a note on which the sentence 'Is she a politician?' is written. You don't know who wrote the note, to whom it was written, or the circumstances in which it was written. You were however told that the sentence was produced by an English speaker, S, who intended the note to be taken literally (as opposed, say, to metaphorically or sarcastically). What would you know about what S meant in producing the note? A plausible first thought is that you would know that the speaker was referring to a certain female and asking whether she was a politician. Similarly if, keeping all else the same, the sentence on the note had been 'It's snowing', then you would know that S meant that it was snowing in a certain place to which she was implicitly referring. What this suggests is that to know the meaning of a sentence σ is for there to be a type of speechact A and a form of content Ψ such that one knows that in a literal and unembedded utterance of σ the speaker is performing an act of kind A whose content is of form Ψ. For example, knowing the meaning of 'Is she a politician?' requires knowing that in a literal and unembedded utterance of it the speaker would perform an act of asking-whether whose content was of the form x f is a politician at t u , where 'x f ' holds a place for a specification of the female to whom the speaker referred with his utterance of 'she' and 't u ' holds a place for a specification of the time of utterance. Similarly, to know the meaning of 'It's snowing' is (to a first approximation) to know that in a literal and unembedded utterance of the sentence the speaker would be performing an act of meaning-that whose content was of the form it's snowing at l at t u , where 'l' holds a place for the location to which the speaker implicitly referred and 't u ' is as before. It should be obvious that the intimate connection that obtains between sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning demands that, if there are such things as sentence meanings, sentence meanings somehow constrain what speakers can mean in uttering sentences with those meanings, and constrain what can be meant narrowly enough so that uttering the sentence is an effective way to communicate propositions that satisfy the constraint. If GGH is correct, then it must be that the A-Ψ pairs that do the constraining in the way indicated are assigned to sentences by the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and thereby count as the meanings of the sentences to which they are assigned. (We may reasonably assume that Ψ is also what is typically assigned to σ when embedded in a larger sentence as σ's contribution to the form of content assigned to the larger sentence; but there may be exceptions to what is typically the case, as there would be for Frege, who was committed to a sentence's having a different meaning when it occurred in the complement clause of a propositional-attitude sentence.) Now, of course I haven't shown that the theory just adumbrated is the best bet for being the semantic component of a generative grammar that verifies GGH, but I think that it is 32 and, more importantly, that it comes close enough to being the best bet to show that any theory that would verify GGH if taken to be the semantic component of a generative grammar for a language would supersede a correct model-theoretic truth theory for the language in just the ways that I will presently argue the adumbrated theory would supersede it. In any case, I will assume as a working hypothesis that the sort of meaning theory just sketched is the best bet for being the semantic component of a generative grammar that verifies GGH, and I will refer to it as the Best Bet theory (or simply as Best Bet).
For the formal semanticist, propositional speech-act sentences are just one more class of sentences for which she must provide truth conditions. For the Best Bet theorist, however, the semantics of those sentences is of foundational importance. This is because she won't know how to understand the content forms her semantic theory must assign to sentences before she understands what the content-ascribing clauses of propositional speech-act reports contribute to the truth conditions of those reports. It is, however, no easy task to know what the italicized clauses in sentences such as the following are up to semantically:
Al said that Betty was a politician

Al asked whether Betty was a politician
Al asked Carl where Betty went on her vacation
Al told Carl to hire Betty
Rather than embarking on the book-length project of trying to set out and defend a semantic theory of these sentences, I propose to help myself to the following two shortcuts.
My first shortcut is that I will pretend that assertoric speech acts-meaning that such-and-such, asserting that such-and-such, telling so-and-so that such-and-such, …-32 See Schiffer (2003, Chapter 3. more accessible exposition than the one that would result if the theory were stated using more plausible candidates for being propositional contents, and, as I trust will become clear in due course, the critical claims I will make on the Russellian assumption will transpose to a version of the theory that uses any other notion of propositional content.
That is why my pretense is a shortcut.
My second shortcut concerns what I won't say about the contents of nonassertoric speech acts. Taking assertoric speech acts to be relations to Russellian propositions commits me, I believe, to taking all propositional speech-act contents to be either Russellian propositions or things defined in terms of them, such as forms of Russellian propositions (e.g. propositions of the form <x, the property of being a dog>). I
believe that for the purposes of this essay I may assume without argument that that commitment is unproblematic on the pretense that assertoric speech acts are relations to
Russellian propositions, and that the arguments I shall offer won't suffer from my mostly focusing on the meanings of those sentences that can be used, when speaking literally, to perform assertoric speech acts.
The thought experiment of a few paragraphs back suggests that to know the meaning of
(1) She is a politician is to know that in a literal and unembedded utterance of (1) there is a female x (or so the speaker intends) such that in uttering (1) the speaker means that x is a politician. Given the assumption that assertoric speech acts are relations to Russellian propositions, this suggests that at a certain level of theorizing we may represent the meaning of (1) as the pair (2) <⊦, x f is a politician>, where '⊦' stands for the act type meaning-that and 'x f is a politician' stands for the propositional form x f is a politician, where 'x f ' holds the place for a female to whom the speaker refers in uttering the sentence, which is equivalent to saying that 'x f is a politician' stands for the property of being a proposition p such that for some female x to whom the speaker refers, p = <x, the property of being a politician>. Given the Russellian pretense, if GGH is correct, then an internally represented generative grammar for English will issue in a theorem that pairs (1) with (2), thereby encapsulating the information that in a literal and unembedded utterance of (1) there is a female x (or so the speaker intends) such that in uttering (1) the speaker means that x is a politician.
So, relative to ongoing assumptions and constraints, Best Bet deems (2) to be the meaning of (1), but not, however, because that can be discerned in the ordinary language use of 'meaning', but only in the sense that there is some relation R-arguably having to do with facts pertaining to the use of language in communication-such that for some type of speech act A and propositional form Ψ, two unambiguous sentences will be equivalent in meaning just in case they both bear R to <A, Ψ>.
Meaning is a property of expression types; a sentence type's meaning is a constraint on what a speaker can mean in uttering tokens of the type, and the meaning of any expression constrains the contribution the expression makes to the meanings of the expressions in which it occurs. Since theorists sometimes speak of e.g. the "metaphorical content" of a sentence token, it's useful to have a notion of semantic content as a property of a sentence token that is defined in terms of the meaning of the sentence type of which the token is a token. When GGH is assumed, we may say that:
(SC) A proposition p is a semantic content of a token σ τ of sentence σ if for some propositional form Ψ,
1) σ means <⊦, Ψ>;
2) p is of form Ψ; and 3) the speaker meant p in uttering σ τ .
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(Note that [SC] stipulates only a sufficient condition for being a semantic content, although, it may be noticed, 1)-3) are separately necessary as well as jointly sufficient for being a semantic content of a token of a truth-evaluable sentence.
[SC] offers only a sufficient condition because we should also want to speak of the semantic content of interrogative, imperative, and whatever other non-truth-evaluable sentences there may be.
The purposes of this essay may be served without venturing to define the notion of semantic content for those cases.) [SC] may then be used to define (at least to a first approximation) the semantic contents of expression tokens that are components of Clinton is a politician' means <⊦, <Hillary Clinton, the property of being a politician>>, then each of those expressions has a constant meaning, as Hillary Clinton will be the semantic content of every token of 'Hillary Clinton' that has a semantic content (qua name of the former US Secretary of State), the property of being a politician will be the semantic content of every token of 'politician' that has a semantic content, and the Russellian proposition that Hillary Clinton is a politician (i.e. <Hillary Clinton, the property of being a politician>) will be the semantic content of every token of 'Hillary
Clinton is a politician' that has a semantic content. On the other hand, the expressions 'she' and 'She is a politician' will have non-constant meanings, as, clearly, different tokens of those expression types may have different semantic contents. It is convenient to represent constant and non-constant meanings as partial functions from tokens onto things that may be the semantic contents of those tokens. 34 Thus, to a pretty rough first approximation (although not so rough that it doesn't convey the general idea) we might have, for example:
34 Then we should say that two expressions ε and ε′ have the same meaning if the functions that are their meanings are the same except that the function ε means has tokens of ε as its domain of arguments, whereas the function ε′ means has tokens of ε′ as its domain of arguments.
• The meaning of 'Hillary Clinton is a politician' = <⊦, f>, where for any token τ of the sentence, f(τ) = the proposition that Hillary Clinton is a politician.
• The meaning of 'Hillary Clinton' = that function f such that for any token τ of the name, f(τ) = Hillary Clinton.
• The meaning of 'politician' = that function f such that for any token τ of the predicate, f(τ) = the property of being a politician.
• The meaning of 'I' = that function f such that for any token τ of the pronoun, f(τ) = x iff x = the person who uttered τ & who referred to herself with τ.
• The meaning of 'she' = that function f such that for any token τ of 'she', f(τ) = x iff x is the female to whom the speaker referred with τ.
• The meaning of 'She is a politician' = <⊦, f>, where for any token τ of the sentence, f(τ) = the proposition that x is a politician iff for some function g, (i) 'she' means g, 35 My impression is that as 'formal semantics' is currently used in linguistics, any semantic theory that uses symbols counts as falling under the 'formal semantics' rubric, even if the theory using the symbols is a Best Bet compositional meaning theory. I trust, however, that by now it's clear that my discussion of "formal semantics" in linguistics is about the sort of model-and truth-theoretic possible-worlds semantics for natural languages-or generalizations of it, such as dynamic semantics-inspired by Montague's work.
(Comments: (1) tells us that a sentence token's truth-value is inherited from that of the proposition that is its semantic content. (2) is what requires me to say that "to a first approximation" the true theory M + conjoins M with (1)-(4). (2) is best thought of as what the truth theory for Russellian propositions would be if it weren't for the Liar and other semantic paradoxes, such as the property version of Russell's paradox, 36 which suggest that the notion of truth it employs isn't fit for service. This, of course, is also a problem for a model-theoretic approach to natural language semantics, and perhaps the only takehome point that I can make here is that if a suitably regenerated notion of truth for propositions is available and 'true' in (2) is taken to express it, then (2) will hold for the Russellian propositions it's permitted to range over. We may assume that if a kosher notion of truth is available for natural language sentences, then one will be available for propositions, and Best Bet will continue to be a theory that holds that sentence tokens inherit their truth conditions from the propositions they express. (3) imparts an important lesson about modal properties. It's a mistake to assume that a possible-worlds semantics in any sense gives the meaning of the modal notions whose logic it aims to capture. How could it? As an account of the meaning of 'possibly', the claim [that a proposition is possible just in case there is some possible world in which it's true] is blatantly circular.
Best Bet would doubtless want to treat the claim that such-and-such proposition is metaphysically necessary as ascribing an irreducible property to the proposition. (4) reminds us that logical, or formal, necessity is in the first instance a property of sentences, but still a property that is definable in terms of the modal properties of propositions. We wouldn't want to say that 'Every bachelor is unmarried' is a logical or formal truth even if we wanted to say that it expressed the proposition that everything that is both a man and unmarried is unmarried, but the notion of logical or formal truth is definable in a way that respects the idea that sentences get their truth conditions from the propositions they express.) 36 Some properties, such as the property of being odorless, instantiate themselves (the property of being odorless is odorless), whereas other properties, such as the property of being a dog, don't instantiate themselves (the property of being a dog isn't a dog), so we seem to have the perfectly good proposition that the property of being a property that doesn't instantiate itself instantiates itself; yet when that proposition is fed into (2) we get the contradiction that it's false if it's true and true if it's false.
OK, so we have two true theories, T, the model-theoretic possible-worlds truth theory for E, and M, the Best Bet meaning theory for M. It should be clear that M is a more fundamental semantic theory of E than T. For M's being true explains why T is true, but T 's being true doesn't explain why M is true. Moreover, M's being true explains T's being true in a way that demonstrates that there is a way of assigning truth conditions to the sentences of E which supersedes T's way of assigning them. Barbara
Partee says somewhere that while a model-theoretic possible-worlds truth theory for a language can't on its own be a theory of meaning for that language (because a sentence's possible-worlds truth conditions can't be equated with its meaning), nevertheless, those truth conditions will be a large part of the sentence's meaning, and thus the truth theory will be a large part of the language's meaning theory. But even that can't be true: the meaning theory doesn't use the notion of a possible world, and so in no literal sentence will a possible-worlds truth theory be "part" of the meaning theory, and, furthermore, the truth theory won't even be logically derivable from the meaning theory, since there is no sense in which the meaning theory can be construed as an extension, conservative or otherwise, of the truth theory: a logical entailment is precluded just by virtue of the fact that the truth theory uses notions (e.g. models and possible worlds) that don't occur in the meaning theory. Semantics in linguistics is supposed to be, or so my Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics tells me, "the study of meaning." This means that the formal semanticist can't be unconcerned that the kind of semantic theory for a natural language that interests her has no place in a theory of linguistic competence. For if GGH is correct, then the more fundamental semantic theory is the compositional meaning theory that is the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and if that is so, then linguistic semantics has so far ignored what really ought to be its primary concern.
That of course is consistent with recognizing that there is much to be learned from formal semanticists about the semantics of natural languages, as witnessed, for example, by work done in formal semantics on anaphora and natural language quantifiers. 
